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1. Introduction 
 
The dramatic rise of the number of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) during the last 
two decades has raised a question about the impact of PTAs on multilateral trade 
liberalization (MTL).
1
 Assuming different motivations behind PTAs, recent political 
economy models have shown that PTAs can act either as a ‘building block’ or a ‘stumbling 
block’ for governments’ incentives to reduce multilateral tariffs. 2  The scarce empirical 
literature, which is characterised by methodological differences as well as differences in 
underlying policy settings, also shows opposing findings.
3
 So it is not clear whether the 
different findings are caused by differences in empirical methodologies or by differences in 
the underlying policy environments. 
 
Our paper adds to the empirical literature on preferential trade agreements by 
providing the first empirical investigation of the impact of Japan’s trade preferences on 
changes of its Most-favoured Nation (MFN) tariffs during the Uruguay Round. By focusing 
on Japan, we extend the existing literature to a clear-cut PTA – MTL policy context of non-
reciprocal trade preferences granted by a large industrialised country to a set of developing 
countries, in which significant intra-bloc competition following the PTA formation is likely 
to have been rather limited. In this paper, and in other work (Ketterer et al., 2014), we argue 
that the impact of preferences is likely to be affected by the type of trading partner or partners 
the preferences have been offered to and the associated policy context. Compared to previous 
evidence on Canada, the European Union and the United States, where trade preferences have 
often been simultaneously granted to less competitive (developing) and also highly 
competitive trading partners, Japan represents a quite distinctive policy setting given its 
exclusive focus on unilateral GSP preferences granted to smaller trading partners before the 
start of the 21
st
 century.  
 
                                                          
1
 While 124 preferential trade agreements had been notified to the WTO from 1948 to 1994, more than 370 were 
notified between 1995 and 2011 (www.wto.org). 
2
 See Freund and Ornelas (2010) of a recent survey of the literature on PTAs. 
3 
Limão (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão (2008) analyse bound multilateral tariff changes of preferentially 
and non-preferentially traded goods during the Uruguay Round, whereas Bohara et al. (2004), Estevadeordal et 
al. (2008), and Calvo-Pardo et al. (2010) analyse the relationship between preferential and multilateral tariff 
changes by regressing applied MFN tariff changes on lagged values of preferential tariff changes in panel data 
settings using OLS and IV estimators. The former two studies find evidence for preferences hindering further 
multilateral tariff reductions, whereas the latter studies find evidence for the opposite. In addition, using a cross-
sectional regression approach Bohara et al. (2004) estimate the influence of Brazil’s exports to Argentina on the 
latter’s external tariffs in the presence of Mercosur and find that increasing preferential imports resulted in lower 
Argentine external tariffs. 
3 
 
In line with the hypothesised importance of the associated policy context, we find 
empirical evidence for a stumbling block effect of Japan’s GSP preferences.4 Indeed, the 
potential for GSP preferences to result in multilateral liberalisation inertia represents a long-
lasting concern originally voiced by the opponents of the GSP system, when it was first 
proposed in the 1960s (Johnson, 1967). Moreover, GSP trade preferences have often been 
found to support diplomatic policy objectives, rather than solely representing altruistic 
economic development assistance (Komuro, 2009).
5
 The threat of an erosion of preferences, 
or even their elimination, when liberalising trade multilaterally, may limit the use of 
preferences as possible leverage for non-trade related objectives, and may reduce preference 
granting countries’ incentives to cut trade barriers multilaterally. 
 
The incentive to exchange preferences for closer diplomatic (i.e. non-trade related) 
cooperation may result in less aggressive tariff cuts for preferentially traded goods. Valuing 
the smaller trading partner’s closer diplomatic cooperation, Japan may subsequently face an 
additional constraint on lowering its external tariffs in order to preserve PTA-negotiated 
preference margins. As a result, Japanese policy makers may have been less aggressive in 
reducing UR bound external tariffs in the presence than in the absence of GSP trade 
preferences.  
 
In section 2 we sketch out an analytical framework that highlights how differences in 
policy environments result in different predictions about how a PTA affects multilateral tariff 
reductions. Our framework compares the possible ‘non-economic policy concession’ motive 
(Limão, 2007) with the rent destruction dimension of a PTA (Ornelas, 2005). The theoretical 
analysis implies that it is an empirical question to decide which forces are at work, with the 
possibility that potentially opposing forces result in no effect.  
 
Following a short description of Japan’s trade policy and Uruguay Round tariff cuts in 
section 3, section 4 explains our empirical methodology. In order to estimate the impact of 
GSP preferences on MFN tariff changes, we use tariff changes on non-GSP goods as the 
                                                          
4
 Our empirical evidence of a stumbling block effect of GSP preferences for Japan stands in contrast to Ketterer 
et al. (2014, Table 3) where we find no stumbling block effect of GSP preferences for Canada in three out of 
four specifications. We explain this by the difference in policy context, with Japan offering trade preferences 
only to small, developing countries (at the time of the Uruguay Round).  
5
 The use of trade linkages as tools for diplomatic or strategic security objectives has also been acknowledged in 
an extensive international relations literature, including arguments of preferential trade and global supply chains 
representing essential cornerstones for political cooperation (see Freidman, 2005, for a more recent account of 
this literature). 
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counterfactual for tariff changes in the absence of GSP. Since this identification is the same 
as in Limão (2006), Karacaovali and Limão (2008) and Ketterer et al. (2014), one can explain 
differences in results by differences in policy contexts. 
 
Our empirical results, reported in section 5, apply OLS and IV-GMM estimation 
techniques to estimate the impacts of Japanese trade preferences on 6-digit HS variation in 
Uruguay Round tariff changes. Our empirical findings are statistically significant and we find 
larger MFN tariff concessions, of the order of 1.6 to 1.8 percentage points, for non-GSP 
goods relative to GSP goods. Our results hence identify a significantly larger stumbling block 
effect for Japan compared to the EU (1.3 to 1.5) and the US (1.0 to 1.3), which we interpret 
as reflecting the distinctive nature of Japan’s GSP-focused PTA policy setting, with the scope 
for significant rent destruction being absent and the opportunity for non-economic policy 
motivations being more important. 
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2. Analytical Framework 
 
We consider a simple conceptual framework that incorporates two principle 
mechanisms through which trade preferences can promote or hinder external multi-lateral 
tariff reductions. We nest the ‘non-economic concession’ motivation of a PTA (Limão, 2007) 
with the rent destruction potential of a PTA (Ornelas, 2005). We highlight how different 
assumptions regarding the objectives of a PTA result in different predictions and refer the 
reader to these original papers for the detailed theoretical treatments. 
Consider a three-economy framework, consisting of Home, Foreign and the Rest of the 
World (ROW), which examines how Home’s external tariff formation against ROW is 
endogenously affected by Home granting preferences to Foreign. Using the standard 
assumption that each country is a natural importer of a distinct subset of goods and that tariffs 
are the only instrument of protection, permits us to focus on Home’s external import tariff t as 
the main choice variable for Home’s representative import good. In the absence of a 
preferential trade agreement and any political economy considerations, Home chooses a tariff 
t that optimizes national welfare W(t), defined as the sum of producers’ surplus, consumers’ 
surplus and tariff revenue.  
In a political economy environment with lobbying from domestic industry and 
preference granting to Foreign, the Home government maximizes a political objective 
function G which is the sum of national welfare W(t), the value of Foreign’s cooperation on 
non-trade issues eF and the amount of campaign contributions T by the import competing 
domestic industry: 
  
   G(t,eF, T)=W(t)+λ1e
F+ λ2T,      (1) 
 
where λ1 and λ2 are non-negative weights. The political objective function (1) nests the two 
prototype preferential trade agreements by the parameters λ1 and λ2. We can now sketch out 
the difference between Home’s optimal external political tariff in the absence and presence of 
a PTA, denoted by tp and tpPTA, respectively, and contingent on the type of preferential trade 
agreement.   
If λ1>0 and λ2=0; we consider a prototype PTA where Home is not subject to political 
campaign contributions by import competing sectors and the preferential trade agreement 
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affects the government’s objective function only through the channel of Foreign’s 
cooperation on non-trade issues eF. This ‘political environment’ of a PTA has been modelled 
by Limão (2007) who has argued that a PTA can be viewed as Home granting trade 
preferences to Foreign in exchange for Foreign’s provision of eF. Since a reduction of Home’s 
external tariff will reduce (or even eliminate) the value of the preference margin to Foreign, it 
will reduce Foreign’s willingness to provide eF. This implies that Home’s external tariff 
reductions are predicted to be smaller in the presence than in the absence of a PTA: 
 
    Δt
p
PTA <Δ t
p
 .      (2)  
     
The prediction (2) is expected to occur in PTAs where Home is large relative to Foreign 
and the preference granted to Foreign is in exchange of Foreign’s cooperation on non-trade 
issues such as closer diplomatic ties, strategic defence considerations or the promotion of 
common standards or regulations (all summarized in eF). The fully specified model of the 
interaction between such a PTA and Home’s external (or multi-lateral) tariff was first 
articulated by Limão (2007) and later extended by Karacaovali and Limão (2008). 
In contrast, if λ2>0 and λ1=0, we consider a prototype where the preferential trade 
agreement affects the government’s objective function through its impact on domestic 
campaign contributions by import-competing sectors. In this setting, campaign contributions 
are linked to lobbying by import-competing sectors regarding external tariffs and how this 
lobbying is affected by a PTA. Specifically, Ornelas (2005) has shown that a PTA can reduce 
lobbying behaviour for tariffs through a “rent destruction effect”. Because a PTA reduces 
tariffs between its members, it provides firms in partner countries with greater access to the 
home market. Both the increase in foreign competition and the ‘leakage of benefits’ to PTA 
partner industries from domestic lobbying for external tariffs will diminish the incentive and 
the capacity of Home’s import-competing sector to lobby. As a result, Home’s external tariff 
reduction is predicted to be higher in the presence than in the absence of a PTA:  
    
    ΔtpPTA >Δt
p  .      (3) 
  
While inequality (2) implies that one should observe higher multi-lateral tariff cuts in 
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the absence than in the presence of a PTA, inequality (3) implies just the opposite. So the 
impact of PTAs on multilateral tariff setting depends on the context of the PTA. Since each 
prototype PTA suggests a mechanism which operates in an opposite direction, it is possible 
that both mechanisms are at work in real world PTAs. This implies a possibility of no 
detectable empirical effect.  
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3. Japan’s Preferential Trade Policy and Uruguay Round Tariff Cuts 
 
 
3.1 Japanese Trade Preferences 
Japan’s preferential trade policy has been characterized by a strong focus on 
preferences granted to developing and emerging economies. Until the start of the 21
st
 century, 
Japan’s preferential trading schemes were limited to GSP and LGSP preferences which were 
first established in 1971 and periodically reviewed thereafter.
 6
 While GSP trade preferences 
mainly granted positive and zero-tariff preferential market access to a range of developing 
countries on designated products in particular for industrial and mining products, with only a 
few preferences granted on agricultural goods, LGSP trade preferences established additional 
trade concessions in the form of duty free access for almost all imports from the world’s 
poorest economies.
7 
From the early 2000s onwards and after the Uruguay Round tariff cuts, 
investigated in this paper, Japan’s preferential trade policy changed remarkably (Urata, 
2004). In contrast to its previous reluctance to grant additional trade preferences alongside its 
GSP systems, Japan started to sign several bilateral economic partnership agreements (EPAs) 
with the conclusion of 13 bilateral EPAs by the end of 2011.
8
 
 
Analysing Japan’s external tariff policy during the Uruguay Round (1986-1994), we 
focus in our empirical analysis on Japanese preferences granted or in place at the time of the 
final UR negotiations and thus on preferences granted under the country’s GSP or LGSP 
systems. Despite having been introduced in the GATT’s trade policy framework for 
development reasons, these preferential schemes have also been found to be used to support 
                                                          
6
 Japan revised its GSP system four times until 2011. The respective starting dates of the decennial schemes 
were 1981, 1991 and 2001 (Komuro, 2009). 
7
 In our dataset there are 1336 product lines covered by GSP trade preferences and only around 22 which were 
additionally part of the LGSP system. In 1994, 149 products were imported from a least developed country 
(LDC), while 2275 products were imported from the group of GSP countries. Note that in our empirical 
investigation we use an interaction variable combining product-level information on preferences granted and 
actual imports from the respective preference receiving country. 
8
 Japan concluded its first EPA with Singapore in 2002 and further economic partnership agreements (EPAs) 
with Mexico, Malaysia, the Philippines, Chile and Thailand followed in rapid succession. Until the end of 2011 
Japan concluded 13 bilateral EPAs, including trade concessions granted to ASEAN countries and India. In 
addition to mutual preferential market access concessions, Japan’s EPA policy further includes strong elements 
of economic and non-economic cooperation such as common regulations on investment rules, competition laws 
as well as environment-, and energy-conservation. For more detailed information of EPAs in the East-Asian 
region see Kawai and Wignaraja (2008). The bilateral Japan-Singapore Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) 
entered into force in 2002, the Japan-Mexico and Japan-Malaysia EPAs in 2005 and 2006 respectively, while 
Japan’s EPAs with Chile and Thailand were enforced in 2007, and the one with the Philippines in 2008. Further 
agreements were concluded with Indonesia, Brunei, ASEAN, Vietnam (all in 2008) as well as with Switzerland 
(2009), India and Peru (both 2011). In addition, Annex Figure 1 provides a brief graphical overview of Japan’s 
aggregated GSP/LGSP and MFN tariff evolution over time. The latter tends to point to a five-year phasing-in 
period for most of the UR negotiated tariff cuts and a relatively small difference between the applied and bound 
MFN tariffs thereafter. 
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national policy-makers’ “short-term nationalistic political objectives that are not materially 
related to overall economic development” (Jackson, 1997:160). Employed as diplomatic 
‘bargaining chips’ for the government’s non-trade related policy objectives, trade 
preferences, in particular when not based on mutual market access concessions, may 
therefore be seen as components of trade- as well as foreign-policy instruments (Komuro, 
2009). Developed countries granting preferential market access to less developed trading 
partners may therefore have an incentive to maintain these preferences and oppose excessive 
multilateral liberalisation, as they can be employed as possible side payments for closer non-
economic political cooperation (Limão and Olarreaga, 2006). Japan’s penchant to use trade 
preferences as a complement to foreign policy objectives may be hinted at by the Japanese 
Council of Ministers recent statement on the policy objectives of Economic Partnership 
Agreements which highlights the latters‘ role in promoting the “creation of [an] international 
environment beneficial to our country” and to “strengthen our economic power and [ability 
to] tackle political and diplomatic challenges”.9 
 
3.2 Uruguay Round Tariff Concessions 
Multilateral trade negotiations in the Uruguay Round (UR) started in 1986 and lasted 
until 1994. More than 100 participating countries agreed to legally binding tariff cuts on 
numerous goods including concessions negotiated in so-called sectoral agreements (e.g. 
textile, chemicals etc.). In order to achieve an informal tariff reduction aim of one third, 
participating countries were asked to submit ‘line-by-line’ reduction proposals as a starting 
point for further negotiations.
10
 
 
Table 1 provides an illustration of Japan’s bound ad-valorem MFN tariff rates before 
and after the UR as well as the agreed cuts per industry. The sectors with the largest average 
tariff protection before and after the Uruguay Round were the beverage, processed food and 
tobacco industries. In addition, several industries showed (rather low) average protection 
                                                          
9
 For more information see Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry (METI), (2005:4). 
10
 While during preceding multilateral trade rounds (e.g. Tokyo Round) the application of so-called ‘formula 
approaches’ used to be common practise (cf. GATT Article 28 bis), the UR failed to reach a common consensus 
on mutually acceptable reduction modalities. While the United States favoured an item-by-item approach, other 
participants were opposed since they feared that the latter approach would allow for continuing high protection 
in certain sectors (WTO, 2005). The GATT contracting parties finally agreed to reduce their tariffs “with a 
target amount of overall reductions at least as ambitious as that achieved by the [Swiss-] formula participants in 
the Tokyo Round” (WTO, 2005), a statement that was generally interpreted as an overall tariff reduction of 
33.3% (Hoda, 2001; WTO, 2005).  
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rates of around 4 percentage points before the Round, including the paper, printing, 
petroleum, machinery and transport equipment industries; most of which are characterized by 
even lower rates or duty-free access after the UR negotiations (Table 1, Columns 2 and 3).  
 
The largest average tariff cuts were experienced in the processed food and beverage 
industries. With sector-level reductions of 7 and 14 percentage points, respectively, the latter 
were clearly above the average cut across all industries of around 4 percentage points (Table 
1, Column 3). Analysing Japan’s Uruguay Round tariff concessions as a percent of initial (i.e. 
pre-UR) bound rates, rather than percentage points, identifies the paper, printing, machinery, 
transport and scientific equipment industries as the sectors with tariff cuts above 95 percent, 
whereas the tobacco industry was characterized by the lowest average tariff reductions of 
around 17 percent (Table 1, Column 5). Coefficients of variation also displayed in Table 1, 
Column (4), further point to the presence of significant variations regarding the magnitude of 
the product-level MFN tariff cuts within individual industries. Finally, comparing actual with 
the one third hypothetical reductions (Table 1, Column 4 and 6, respectively), also reveals 
that the tariff cuts were not uniformly applied across different industries to achieve the 
informal reduction target. 
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Table 1: Japan's Bound MFN Tariff Reductions agreed upon during the Uruguay Round per Industry 
  
   
      (1) (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) 
  
  Before Uruguay 
Round 
  After Uruguay 
Round 
  Uruguay Round Tariff Cuts 
(Percentage Points) 
Uruguay Round Tariff 
Cuts (Percent) 
Hypothetical  
1/3reduction target 
  
 
  ISIC 
code 
Sector name Tariff Lines Mean  Std. dev. 
 
Mean  Std. dev. 
 
Mean Std. dev. Coef. Var. 
Mean                         
(% of pre-UR rates) 
Mean                     
(percentage points) 
311 Food products 87 0.19 0.21 
 
0.12 0.12 
 
-0.07 0.10 1.41 -37.9 -0.13 
313 Beverages 4 0.25 0.18 
 
0.11 0.08 
 
-0.14 0.11 0.73 -56.2 -0.17 
314 Tobacco 2 0.15 0.07 
 
0.12 0.05 
 
-0.03 0.02 0.64 -17.5 -0.10 
321 Textiles 148 0.09 0.05 
 
0.06 0.03 
 
-0.04 0.02 0.66 -40.5 -0.06 
322 Wearing apparel except footwear 68 0.11 0.03 
 
0.07 0.03 
 
-0.03 0.01 0.43 -34.9 -0.07 
323 Leather products 20 0.09 0.05 
 
0.07 0.07 
 
-0.02 0.02 0.82 -40.6 -0.06 
324 Footwear except rubber or plastics 2 0.07 0.04 
 
0.06 0.03 
 
-0.01 0.01 0.54 -20.5 -0.05 
331 Wood products except furniture 20 0.07 0.06 
 
0.03 0.02 
 
-0.05 0.05 0.97 -59.9 -0.05 
332 Furniture except metal 16 0.05 0.00 
 
0.01 0.02 
 
-0.04 0.01 0.36 -79.2 -0.03 
341 Paper and products 86 0.04 0.02 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
-0.04 0.02 0.43 -96.3 -0.03 
342 Printing and publishing 11 0.04 0.00 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.04 0.00 0.04 -100.0 -0.03 
351 Industrial chemicals 464 0.06 0.02 
 
0.03 0.02 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.68 -40.0 -0.04 
352 Other chemicals 137 0.06 0.02 
 
0.01 0.03 
 
-0.04 0.02 0.46 -79.6 -0.04 
353 Petroleum refineries 13 0.04 0.02 
 
0.02 0.02 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.33 -63.8 -0.02 
354 Miscellaneous petroleum and coal products 3 0.04 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
-0.03 0.02 0.59 -77.1 -0.03 
355 Rubber products 37 0.05 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
-0.04 0.01 0.33 -84.9 -0.03 
356 Plastic products 42 0.07 0.04 
 
0.05 0.04 
 
-0.02 0.01 0.46 -38.0 -0.05 
361 Pottery china earthenware 12 0.04 0.00 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
-0.03 0.01 0.37 -77.2 -0.03 
362 Glass and products 46 0.05 0.02 
 
0.01 0.02 
 
-0.04 0.01 0.26 -81.7 -0.03 
369 Other non-metallic mineral products 51 0.04 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
-0.03 0.01 0.47 -68.6 -0.03 
371 Iron and steel 137 0.05 0.01 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
-0.05 0.01 0.24 -94.3 -0.04 
372 Non-ferrous metals 87 0.06 0.03 
 
0.03 0.02 
 
-0.03 0.01 0.37 -58.0 -0.04 
381 Fabricated metal products 214 0.05 0.01 
 
0.01 0.01 
 
-0.04 0.01 0.37 -81.0 -0.03 
382 Machinery except electrical 344 0.05 0.01 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
-0.05 0.01 0.18 -97.7 -0.03 
383 Machinery electric 154 0.04 0.01 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
-0.04 0.01 0.29 -95.7 -0.03 
384 Transport equipment 89 0.04 0.01 
 
0.00 0.00 
 
-0.04 0.01 0.25 -100.0 -0.03 
385 Professional and scientific equipment 130 0.05 0.01 
 
0.00 0.01 
 
-0.05 0.01 0.19 -97.4 -0.03 
390 Other manufactured products 108 0.05 0.02   0.02 0.02 
 
-0.03 0.01 0.38 -68.8 -0.03 
  Total 2532 0.07 0.03   0.03 0.03   -0.04 0.02 0.51 -67.4 -0.05 
Notes: The sample includes 2532 non-missing observations at the HS 6-digit level. Product lines with pre-UR duty free bound MFN tariffs have been excluded due to the impossibility of granting tariff preferences 
on the latter products. Column (1) reports the total number of goods per ISIC 3-digit industry, whereas Columns (2) to (4) illustrate simple average means and standard deviations of pre- and post-UR bound MFN 
tariff rates as well as the tariff reductions per industry. The coefficients of variation, in Column (4), have been calculated as the ratio of the std. deviation to the mean reduction. Column (5) reflects the negotiated 
MFN tariff rate changes in percent rather than percentage points, while Column (6) illustrates the hypothetical post-UR MFN rates if the informal reduction aim for developed countries of one-third had been applied 
to each industry.  
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4. Empirical Methodology 
 
4.1 Identification and Estimating Equation  
Equations (2) and (3) make opposite predictions about the effects of trade preferences 
on external tariff changes. Because it is not possible to observe changes in external tariffs 
both in the presence and absence of trade preferences, we follow Limão (2006) in exploiting 
external tariff changes on non-PTA goods as the counterfactual for external tariff changes in 
the absence of a PTA. Equation (2) seeks to capture the scope for differential external tariff 
cuts for non-GSP goods relative to GSP goods (i.e. preferentially imported products). 
 Our estimating equation aims to explain product level changes in Japan’s external 
tariff cuts during the Uruguay Round
11
:  
 
   .μtΔXPRIΔt i1ti,5h4i3i2i1i      (4) 
 
 Our dependent variable Δti is the change in Japan’s negotiated bound MFN tariff 
during the Uruguay Round, measured at the 6-digit HS product level.
12
 Our key explanatory 
variable is the binary variable Ii, which takes the value 1 if a GSP-specific preferential tariff 
was granted for product i and if the product was also imported, otherwise it is 0.
13
 Given the 
policy context, we hypothesize a positive sign for Ii, which would imply a stumbling block 
effect and smaller tariff cuts for GSP than non-GSP goods.  
In addition, we include a series of control variables that account for other factors that 
might impact multilateral tariff negotiations and which have also been considered in previous 
studies in the literature.
14
 The variable Ri aims to capture Japanese tariff concessions that are 
motivated by reciprocity in tariff negotiations with its main trading partners. This variable is 
defined as a proxy measure for Japan’s reciprocal tariff concessions under the WTO’s 
reciprocity principle and is calculated as Ri = ∑k sit
k
 [∑iwi
k∆ti
k
/ti
k
]. Ri is constructed by first 
averaging the tariff concessions across each product i for a WTO member country k using the 
corresponding import weight wi
k
 (i.e. ∑iwi
k∆ti
k
/ti
k
). Recognizing that that Japan might have 
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This specification can also be found in Limão (2006) and Ketterer et al. (2014).   
12
 We have excluded products characterized by a zero MFN tariff prior to the Uruguay Round and also excluded 
agricultural products because of the prevalence of non-tariff barriers to trade in that sector. This has left us with 
a total sample of 2532 product lines. 
13
 In our estimations we consider GSP-good specifications for Japanese preferences granted under the GSP as 
well as the LGSP trading schemes.  Our binary variable pertains to preferential access in 1993 or 1994. 
Following the suggestions of a referee, we also conducted a robustness check by running our benchmark 
regressions using 1988 preferences and import data. Because we continued to find a statistically significant 
building block effect, we did not report the results in the paper.   
14
 Our specification follows Ketterer et al. (2014).  
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been only engaged in direct trade talks with its most important import suppliers, we then 
aggregate over Japan’s top-5 import suppliers’ using country k’s import share in good i (sit
k
) 
as an additional weight.
15
 
Reciprocal tariff reductions in combination with the GATT’s MFN principle may give 
rise to an MFN externality effect, with potentially lower tariff cuts in the presence of many 
smaller trading partners which may benefit from the larger countries’ reciprocal concessions 
without having to offer any reductions by themselves. A sizable number of smaller ‘free-
riding’ trading partners may then result in a reduced willingness to offer substantial 
concessions on the part of the larger economies since these cannot expect any meaningful 
reciprocal tariff reductions in return.
 
Because information on Japan’s direct negotiating 
partners is not available, we aim to account for this effect by introducing a variable reflecting 
the change in Japan’s non top-5 exporters per product line i between 1994 and 1989. 16 Using 
the change in non top-5 exporters as a proxy for the potential of an MFN externality effect, 
we define a control variable Pi as an indicator taking the value one if the latter variation in the 
number of non-top 5 suppliers is larger than the median change and zero otherwise. 
We follow the literature by introducing a control variable hΔX , which aims to capture 
the political power of a sector h in influencing multilateral tariff cuts. This variable is defined 
as hΔX =∆(Xh/Mh)/εh, where ∆(Xh/Mh) measures the change in the inverse import penetration 
ratio between the final phase of the Uruguay Round (1992) and the end of the Tokyo Round 
(1978) and εh represents the corresponding ISIC 3-digit import demand elasticity in sector 
h.
17
 Our last control variable takes account of the possibility that governments may find it 
easier to reduce tariffs on products where tariff levels are still quite high. Hence we also add 
the level of initial (i.e. pre-UR) bound tariffs 1ti,t   as a regressor in our estimating equation.  
 
4.2  Endogeneity Concerns 
A potential endogeneity concern in the context of preferences and multilateral tariff 
cuts is associated with the possibility of reverse causality. Considering the possibility that 
countries may be more likely to ask for preferential treatment in products for which they 
                                                          
15
 Note that information on Japan’s direct UR negotiating partners in not available. 
16
 It is assumed that if the change of small exporters to Japan per product line i was large enough between 1994 
and 1989, the latter may mirror a longer term change between 1978 (end-Tokyo) and 1994 (end-Uruguay). The 
constructed proxy variable is therefore used as an instrument for the MFN externality effect.  
17
 The construction of the political economy variable traces its origin from Goldberg and Maggi (1999) and 
Gawande and Bandyopadhyay (2000). The inverse import penetration ratio has additionally been multiplied by 
product level import demand elasticities following Ramsey’s standard taxation theory. 
14 
 
expect smaller tariff reductions, anticipated MFN tariff changes may influence whether a 
good receives a preference or not in the first place. In order to control for this we use 
additional IV-GMM estimation techniques as well as OLS. Using an instrumental variable 
approach to account for the latter, we employ the dummy indicating whether a product was 
imported in 1994, 94iD , as an instrument. The rationale behind this instrument is that it is 
directly related to the preference indicator itself, but likely to be unaffected by the UR tariff 
cuts. World-price changes between 1992 and 1994 are used as a second instrument for the 
preference good indicator. Influencing the monetary benefit arising from a preference and 
thus the demand for preferential market access, world price changes between 1992 and 1994 
tend to be uncorrelated with the error term since the UR tariff concessions did not enter into 
force before 1995.
18
 Finally, given that NTBs may lead to an increase of domestic prices 
which are also received by preferential exporters in case of a zero-preferential tariff, countries 
may be more likely to ask for a preference on goods which they expect to be subject to an 
NTB in the future.  Data for 1993 is used as a proxy for future NTBs.
19
 
 
 
Potential endogeneity concerns due to reverse causality may also affect some of the 
introduced control variables. Given that Japan’s tariff cuts may influence other countries’ 
(reciprocal) tariff reductions, the reciprocity variable may also give rise to reverse causality 
concerns. Unilateral tariff reductions implemented between 1986 and 1992 are therefore used 
as an instrument. Most UR-participants reduced their tariffs unilaterally between 1986 and 
1992 despite substantial doubts regarding the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
(Stewart, 1999). Later, during the final phase of the UR, unilateral liberalization efforts were 
explicitly taken into account when the final cuts were agreed upon (Finger et al., 2002). 
Following Karacaovali and Limão (2008), we therefore argue that unilateral tariff reductions 
may serve as a legitimate instrument for the undertaken reciprocal cuts.
20
  
 
                                                          
18
 In light of the fact that a country’s financial benefit arising from preferential market access also depends on 
world prices, the latter may also impact a partner country’s desire for preferential market access. Increasing 
world prices may also help to overcome fixed export costs. 
19 
A country may even be more inclined to ask for a preference if it already exported a given product. We 
therefore interact an NTB indicator variable with an export dummy variable and introduce the combined 
component as an additional instrument. Moreover, world price changes at the 6-digit HS product-level are 
proxied by calculating unit-values using import value and quantity information available at UN-TRAINS. 
20 Finger et al. (2002: 121) note that “according to delegations, the informal practice was more or less to count 
from applied rates in 1986 to the bound rate agreed at the Uruguay Round. By this practice, countries that had, 
after 1986, unilaterally reduced their tariffs would be given ‘credit’ at the round to the extent that they bound 
these cuts at the round.”   
15 
 
The political economy variable may also represent a source of potential endogeneity, 
since the latter’s components are all influenced by domestic prices and therefore by external 
tariffs. In order to account for this we employ the difference in industry-level scale 
economies (i.e. valued added/number of firms) between 1981 and 1992 as an instrument, on 
the grounds that larger economies of scale may point to higher fixed entry costs and therefore 
a higher inverse import penetration ratio. Combining the industry-level scale economies with 
the product-level, world price change (between 1992 and 1994) is finally also used as an 
additional instrument, given that world prices impact on domestic prices and thus on our 
political economy proxy but are likely to be uncorrelated with the error term.
21
  
 
 
4.3 Data Sources 
We highlight the main features of the data and refer to Annex Tables 1 and 2 for the 
detailed description and summary statistics of all variables. Our dependent variable is 
constructed using information on Japan’s 6-digit HS Uruguay Round ad-valorem tariff 
reductions provided by the WTO’s tariff concessions database.22 Japanese preferential tariffs 
as well as value and quantity information of Japan’s import flows, all at the 6-digit HS level, 
are from the UN-TRAINS database.
23
 NTB data for the year 1993, used as an instrument for 
the preference indicator variable, was helpfully provided by the Trade Information 
Department of UNCTAD.
24
 We construct our political economy variable by using import and 
production data from the UNIDO database and import demand elasticities at the ISIC 3-digit 
industry level from Kee et al. (2009). Sector level data on the number of establishments and 
valued added, which were both used to construct an instrument for the political economy 
variable, also come from the UNIDO database.
25
 Finally, we used data from Finger et al. 
(2002) to compose a proxy measure for reciprocal tariff reductions. Aggregating import-
weighted product level UR tariff concessions into country-averages, the latter authors provide 
a measure for the UR-participating countries’ overall tariff concessions. We use this 
information to compute a product-level reciprocity measure, by multiplying country-averages 
                                                          
21
 Note that the UR negotiated tariff reductions took effect from 1995 onwards. 
22
 Following the advice of one of the referees, we also conducted our analysis at the 8-digit HS level.  But since 
our findings of the existence of a stumbling block effect were robust to this modification, we did not include the 
results in the paper.   
23
 Note that product-level concordance tables from UN-TRAINS were used to take into account the partial re-
coding of certain products. 
24
 The latter data is publicly not available at UN-TRAINS. 
25
 Note that clustering of standard errors at the ISIC 3-digit industry level is used to take into account the 
different aggregation levels of the political economy variable and its instruments. 
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from Finger et al. (2002) by 6-digit HS import-shares from Japan’s most important suppliers 
(retrieved from UN-TRAINS). 
 
5. Estimation Results and Robustness Tests 
 
5.1 Main Findings 
Table 2 presents the main regression results using heteroscedasticity-robust OLS and 
IV-GMM estimation techniques. The results show, in all model specifications, a ‘stumbling 
block’ effect, with coefficients that vary between 0.016 and 0.018 and which are all 
statistically significant at the 1% level. Providing support for the argument that Japanese 
trade preferences, in place at the time of the Uruguay Round, hindered further multilateral 
tariff liberalization, our results point to less aggressive tariff reductions of, on average, 1.6 to 
1.8 percentage points for preferentially imported goods than for goods not receiving any 
preferential treatment or not being imported at all.
 26
 Our results therefore are in line with 
Limão’s (2006) and Karacaovali and Limão’s (2008) findings for the US and the EU of a net 
‘stumbling block’ effect when granting preferential market access to smaller trading partners 
in exchange for a closer political relationship. They are, however, in contrast to our own 
finding (Ketterer et al., 2014) for Canada and the preferences granted to the USA under 
CUSFTA. 
 
Comparing the estimation results across different GSP-good definitions shows similar 
findings for all model specifications displayed in Table 2. Reporting a ‘stumbling block’ 
effect of 1.8 percentage points for preferences granted under both, the GSP and LGSP trading 
schemes, the OLS estimations are corroborated by the respective IV-GMM results which 
show a slightly smaller, yet still highly significant, effect of about 1.7 percentage points 
(Table 2, Columns 1 and 5). The results for the respective duty-free tariff preferences granted 
also tend to support these findings by showing the same parameter estimates (Table 2, 
Column 2 for OLS and Column 6 for IV-GMM).
27
 Subdividing Japan’s preferential trade 
concessions in individual trading schemes provides further interesting insights. Preferences 
granted under Japan’s GSP system show significant ‘stumbling block’ coefficients of 0.018 
and 0.017 when estimated with OLS and IV-GMM, respectively, both significant at a 1% 
                                                          
26
 Moreover, in light of Japanese overall tariff concessions of around 4.5 percentage points for non-PTA goods, 
and a 3.8 percentage point overall reduction, the detected stumbling block effect also points to a certain 
economic importance. 
27 
The latter points to the relatively large number of duty-free imported preference goods in our sample. 
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threshold (Table 2, Columns 3 and 9). Duty-free GSP preferences show almost identical 
results, with a slightly smaller effect when using OLS (Table 2, Column 4 and 7). Analysing 
the impact of LGSP preferences corroborates these findings by showing a positive ‘stumbling 
block’ effect which, however, tends to imprecisely measured when using IV-GMM, and 
hence is only significant at the usual levels when estimated with OLS (these results are 
reported in Annex Table 3).
 28
 
 
Table 3 reports the results when considering more restrictive definitions of GSP- 
goods, by taking into account the relative importance of GSP-import flows (Columns 1 to 4 ), 
and a pre-specified required difference between product-level MFN and preferential tariff 
rates (i.e. the preferential tariff margin). While external tariff cuts for product lines with 
significant GSP-import shares may face increasing opposition given their importance for the 
partner country and the trade-off of preferences for cooperation on non-trade issues, 
considering a pre-specified difference between the MFN and preferential tariff rates accounts 
for potential costs when using the preferential tariff rate (and hence the possibility to use the 
MFN rate despite the presence of a preferential rate). To take these aspects into account 
Columns (1) to (4) introduce a 5 and 10% GSP-import share in the GSP-good specification, 
whereas Columns (5) to (8) consider a classification of GSP goods if the difference between 
the external and preferential tariff is larger than two percentage points. Overall, the results in 
Table 3 confirm our previous findings of a stumbling block effect. In fact, the stronger 
stumbling block effect in some specifications suggests a higher resistance to external tariff 
cuts for preferentially-traded products which may be considered as important for the 
preference-receiving trading partner.
29
 
 
The results for the remaining variables, displayed in Table 2 and Table 3, point to a 
rather weak impact of political economy forces on Japan’s Uruguay Round tariff 
commitments; the latter only being significant when estimated with IV-GMM in Table 2 and 
3. Showing statistically significant coefficients, which vary between 0.003 and 0.018, our 
                                                          
28 
The any- and zero-tariff LGSP preference good specifications (Annex Table 3) both show parameter estimates 
of 0.020, significant at the 1% level, when using the OLS estimator, and parameter estimates of 0.028 with IV-
GMM. Moreover, it is also worth noting that the LGSP results are based on a very small set of PTA goods 
(covering 22 product lines) which implies that a certain caution is needed when interpreting these results. 
29
 Note that the OLS results for the significant import share specifications report slightly smaller coefficients 
compared to the respective results in table 2 (columns 3 and 7). The magnitude of the coefficients in all other 
specifications in table 3 is however considerable larger. 
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findings only provide partial evidence for lower tariff reductions in politically influential 
sectors.
30
  
 
Consistent evidence for reciprocity based tariff cuts is not found when analysing their 
impact on Japan’s UR tariff concessions. Negative coefficients for some of the preference 
specifications are found when using IV-GMM estimation techniques, suggesting smaller 
Japanese tariff reductions on products imported from UR participating countries which 
themselves implemented larger product-level tariff reductions. Free-riding strategies on the 
part of other countries also seem to have played a minor role for Japanese policy makers 
when establishing their own tariff commitments, as indicated by non-significant coefficients 
for the MFN externality variable in all model specifications.  
 
Finally, initial tariff rates included in the estimation to control for potentially larger 
tariff cuts on products with initially high tariffs, show highly significant parameter estimates 
in all model specifications pointing to an important impact of the level of pre-UR bound tariff 
rates on the final UR tariff concessions.
31
 
 
Statistical robustness tests presented at the bottom of Table 2 and Table 3 point to 
generally robust findings.
32
 Hansen J-tests of the joint relevance of the instruments point to a 
high instrument significance in almost all model specifications.
33
 Difference-in-Sargan test 
statistics analysing the exogeneity of the more endogeneity prone instruments also reject, in 
most specifications, the correlation hypothesis to the error term.
34
 Moreover, further 
statistical endogeneity tests, also displayed at the bottom of Table 2 and Table 3, do not 
indicate severe endogeneity concerns. 
                                                          
30
 Note that the results for LGSP preferences, reported in Annex Table 3, show slightly stronger political 
economy influences which are significant at the 1% threshold. 
31
 Excluding initial tariff rates, or more generally all other control variables, leads to qualitatively identical 
findings. These results are not included here but are available upon request. 
32
 First-stage regression results for the IV-GMM estimations are presented in Annex table 4. 
33
 The correlation hypothesis of the second stage error term with the instruments is rejected in all specifications, 
apart from the LGSP specifications in Annex Table 3. 
34
 We follow Ketterer et al. (2014) in choosing the subset of more endogeneity prone instruments and select the 
instruments which include either NTB data or an import dummy variable. 
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Table 2: The Impact of Japanese Trade Preferences on Multilateral Tariff Reductions during the Uruguay Round 
 
OLS   IV-GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6) (7) (8) 
  
GSP & 
LGSP 
GSP & 
LGSP  
(Duty-Free) 
GSP 
GSP 
(Duty-Free) 
 
GSP & 
LGSP 
GSP & 
LGSP  
(Duty-Free) 
GSP 
Duty-Free 
GSP 
Ii
j‡  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.016*** 
 
0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.017*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Ri
‡ 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 
-0.010 -0.010* -0.010* -0.008 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
∆Xh‡     0.003 0.003 0.003 0.003 
 
0.011* 0.011* 0.011* 0.010* 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Pi -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ti,t-1 -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.360*** 
 
-0.334*** -0.334*** -0.334*** -0.326*** 
 (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.025) (0.076) (0.074) (0.074) (0.059) 
Constant -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 
-0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** -0.022*** 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) 
Observations 2532 2532 2532 2532   2532 2532 2532 2532 
Number of PTA goods 1237 1226 1226  1124 
 
1237 1226 1226  1124 
Hansen's J (p-val.)a - - - - 
 
0.685 0.676 0.676 0.628 
C-stat (p-val.)b - - - - 
 
0.660 0.657 0.657 0.630 
Endogeneity (p-val.)c - - - - 
 
0.479 0.446 0.446 0.507 
Heterosked. (p-val.)d 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
          Notes: *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. The estimations reported in Table 2 have been conducted by using 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit ISIC industry level. Columns (1) to (4) report the OLS estimation results under different 
Japanese PTA-good specifications. The respective IV-GMM regression results are illustrated in Columns (5) to (8). ∆Xh has been re-scaled by 10,000. The F-
tests of instrument exclusion in the first-stage regressions report all rejections either at the 1% or 5% significance level and show first-stage F-statistics which 
are larger than 10 for Ii
j
 and Ri. For ∆Xh the F-statistics show values of around 2.3. The first-stage regression results for the main specifications are reported in 
Annex Table 4. (a) Test of over-identifying restrictions using the Sargan-Hansen method which is based on the null hypothesis that the employed instruments 
are valid instruments - i.e. that the latter are (jointly) not correlated with the second stage error term. (b) Exogeneity test for a subset of instruments (using 
Difference-in-Sargan/C-statistics) defining the null hypothesis as instrument exogeneity. The tested instruments include: Danyexp, Dntball, 
Dntball*Danyexp, Dntb, (∆p9294)avg*∆scale. (c) Testing regressor endogeneity under the null hypothesis that the selected variables are exogenous (i.e. 
using OLS provides consistent and efficient results). The potentially endogenous regressors are marked with ‡. (d) Pagan and Hall's heteroskedasticity test for 
instrumental variable regressions under the null hypothesis of no heteroskedasticity.  
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Table 3: GSP Trade Preferences and MFN tariff cuts: Significant GSP Import Shares & Sizeable Preference Margins  
Significant GSP Import Share 
 
Sizeable Preference Margins  
 
OLS 
 
IV-GMM 
 
OLS 
 
IV-GMM 
 
(1) (2)   (3) (4) 
 
(5) (6)   (7) (8) 
  
1994 GSP 
Import Share 
(5%) 
1994 GSP 
Import Share 
(10%) 
 
1994 GSP 
Import Share 
(5%) 
1994 GSP 
Import Share 
(10%) 
 
GSP (Pref. 
Margin > 2%) 
 LGSP (Pref. 
Margin > 2%)  
GSP (Pref. 
Margin > 2%) 
 LGSP (Pref. 
Margin > 2%) 
Ii
 j‡ 0.016*** 0.015*** 
 
0.026*** 0.035*** 
 
0.019*** 0.022*** 
 
0.023*** 0.016 
 
(0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.003) (0.007) 
 
(0.003) (0.004) 
 
(0.003) (0.015) 
Ri
‡ 0.005 0.006 
 
-0.003 0.001 
 
-0.001 -0.006 
 
-0.015*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.008) 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.005) (0.008) 
∆x‡     0.003 0.003 
 
0.014** 0.014*** 
 
0.002 0.002 
 
0.009** 0.018** 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.006) (0.005) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.004) (0.007) 
Pi -0.002 -0.002  
-0.001 -0.0003 
 
-0.0004 -0.003** 
 
0.001 -0.001 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.001) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
 
(0.001) (0.002) 
ti,t-1 -0.374*** -0.375***  
-0.341*** -0.522*** 
 
-0.384*** -0.371*** 
 
-0.338*** -0.317*** 
 
(0.019) (0.020) 
 
(0.104) (0.079) 
 
(0.0124) (0.024) 
 
(0.049) (0.066) 
constant -0.016** -0.014** 
 
-0.018*** -0.007 
 
-0.024*** -0.020*** 
 
-0.030*** -0.022*** 
 
(0.006) (0.007) 
 
(0.007) (0.007) 
 
(0.004) (0.006) 
 
(0.004) (0.005) 
Adjusted R2 0.61 0.59 
 
0.43 0.30 
 
0.71 0.61 
 
0.63 0.34 
Observations 2532 2532 
 
2532 2532 
 
1763 1805 
 
1763 1805 
Number of FTA 
goods 
963 825 
 
963 825 
 
533 13 
 
533 13 
Hansen's J (p-val.)    -    - 
 
0.803 0.840 
 
   -    - 
 
0.929 0.127 
C-stat (p-val.)    -    - 
 
0.707 0.739 
 
   -    - 
 
0.945 0.149 
Endogeneity (p-
val.) 
   -    - 
 
0.436 0.341 
 
   -    - 
 
0.430 0.178 
Heterosked. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Notes. All regressions are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustering at the 3-digit ISIC industry level.  *, **, *** illustrate the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, 
respectively. The potentially endogenous regressors are marked with ‡.  
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5.2 Robustness Tests 
 Table 4 displays the regression results when subjecting our main findings to a series of 
robustness tests. Reporting results for OLS as well as IV-GMM estimation techniques, the 
table shows the findings for the preference good indicator (Ii) variable with the other control 
variables suppressed.
35
 The baseline results from Table 2 (Columns 1 and 5) are replicated  in 
Column 1 for comparison, while the remaining columns illustrate the regression results when 
subjecting the latter baseline findings to various robustness checks.  
 
In order to account for unobserved industry effects we first include an additional 
indicator variable at the 1-digit level when using the Harmonized System (HS) product 
classification. The results, reported in Column (2), confirm our previous findings by showing 
highly significant, although slightly smaller, coefficients on the indicator variable of 0.014 
and 0.015 when estimated with OLS and IV-GMM, respectively. 
 
In light of the so-called sectoral agreements negotiated during the Uruguay Round, we 
also test whether the stumbling block effect still holds when accounting for a potential 
alternative tariff reduction rationale by excluding product lines affected by sectoral 
negotiations. Column (3) reports the results for the so-called ‘zero-for-zero’ tariff 
concessions, while Column (4) additionally takes into account the sectoral negotiations on 
chemicals. With highly significant coefficients of 0.021 and 0.014 (Column 3) as well as 
0.022 and 0.026 (Column 4), we continue to find strong support for a stumbling block effect. 
 
 The exclusion of the reciprocity variable and its instruments in Column 5 of Table 4 
represent a further robustness test by following the structural model more closely.
36
 The 
results confirm again the previous baseline results from Column 1.  
 
Product lines characterized by NTBs which affect all trading partners may point to the 
presence of common unobserved product characteristics which in turn may have an impact on 
the depth of the agreed tariff concessions. As suggested by Karacaovali and Limão (2008), 
we exclude the set of instruments involving the latter NTB variable. The results corroborate 
                                                          
35
 The results for the suppressed variables as well as the first stage regression results for the IV estimations are 
available upon request. 
36
 Note that Karacaovali and Limão’s (2008) theoretical model does not include a reciprocity term in its final 
estimation equation. 
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the above findings, with a slightly smaller but still highly significant GSP good coefficient of 
0.015 (Column 6, Table 5). 
 
Moreover, in light of diverging distributions of GSP and non-GSP goods across sectors 
we additionally analyse whether sector-specific features may drive our stumbling block 
findings by dropping successively single industries. The results, not reported in Table 4 but 
available upon request, confirm the main findings by showing highly significant ‘stumbling 
block’ results when omitting all sectors individually. We also test whether successively 
dropping the introduced covariates affects the results for our main variable of interest, and 
find that the stumbling block effect remains highly significant (Annex Table 5). 
 
Finally, given that the maximum value for the absolute change in the MFN tariff rate is 
zero, indicates that our dependent variable is censored at the value zero. We hence 
additionally employ a Tobit model for the most significant specifications of our preference 
indicator variable. The results are reported in Annex Table 6 and strongly support our 
previous findings by showing, in magnitude and significance level, identical parameter 
estimates for the main variable of interest.
37
 
 
 
Table 4: Robustness Analysis 
OLS & IV-GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Robustness test 
GSP & 
LGSP   
"HS Industry 
Effects" 
"Zero-for-Zero" 
Sectoral 
Agreements 
"Zero-for-Zero" 
Agreements incl. 
Chemicals 
Excluding 
Reciprocity  
Exclude all NTB 
instruments 
Ii
OLS 0.018*** 0.014*** 0.021*** 0.022*** 0.018***    - 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)    - 
Ii
IV 0.017*** 0.015*** 0.014*** 0.026*** 0.018*** 0.015*** 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.003) (0.008) (0.002) (0.004) 
Observations 2532 2532 2061 1479 2532 2532 
Number of PTA goods 1237 1237 1022 557 1237 1237 
Notes: Column (1) above reports the baseline regression results from Table 2 (columns 1 and 5), while the additional robustness test 
findings are display in columns (2) to (6). In all regression concordance tables have been used. Columns (3) and (4) report the findings 
when tariff lines covered by the so-called ‘zero-for-zero’ concessions and by the sectoral agreement on chemicals were excluded. The 
information which we used regarding product coverage of the latter two agreements is based on information provided by the WTO’s 
secretariat (WTO, 2005). Additional tests have been conducted on the basis of excluding individual industries. The latter results (not 
reported above in Table 4, but available upon request) confirm the reported 'stumbling block' findings. All regressions use 
heteroskedasticity robust standard errors clustered at the 3-digit ISIC industry level. *, **, *** illustrate the 10%, 5%, 1% significance 
levels, respectively.  
                                                          
37
 It is, in this context, worthwhile to note that only 14 product lines in our sample are characterised by a zero 
bound MFN tariff rate change. 
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6. Conclusions 
 
The impact of preferential trade agreements (PTAs) on multilateral trade liberalisation 
(MTL) is still subject to a controversial debate. In light of an abundant but inconclusive 
theoretical literature and scarce empirical evidence on the subject matter, we provide new 
theory-based evidence for an important developed Asian economy – i.e. Japan. By focusing on 
Japan’s external tariff liberalisation agreed upon during the Uruguay Round, we aim to extend 
the current empirical literature by using an identification strategy which has been suggested by 
Limão (2006). Analysing negotiated tariff cuts for GSP and non-GSP goods and controlling for a 
broad range of other factors, we find larger tariff reductions for goods not imported under 
preferential market access (i.e. non-GSP goods) after having controlled for other influences. Our 
findings show that tariff concessions on non-GSP goods were on average 1.6 to 1.8 percentage 
points larger than those for preferentially imported goods. 
 
In light of Japan’s strong focus on unilateral GSP preferences granted to smaller trading 
partners before the start of the 21
st
 century, our findings provide support for the argument that 
this was a PTA policy-setting in which preferential market access was granted in exchange for a 
closer political cooperation in general, rather than where rent destruction was at stake. This 
PTA-setting induced a net ‘stumbling block’ effect on the setting of Japan’s multilateral tariffs 
during the Uruguay Round, with smaller tariff reductions being implemented on preferentially 
imported products in order to preserve previously negotiated preference margins and thus in turn 
to preserve the partner countries’ incentives for a continuing commitment towards the non-trade 
based political objectives they had agreed to with Japan in return for preferences. 
 
Our present findings are in line with previous empirical evidence on the US and the EU 
which are both characterized by PTAs formed with smaller trading partners including 
requirements on non-trade related political issues (Limão, 2006; Karacaovali and Limão, 
2008).
38
 Our present findings are, however, in contrast with Ketterer et al. (2014) for Canada in 
the context of the Canadian US free trade agreement. We explain the different findings by the 
difference in the preferential trade policy setting. In the present study we are exploring the 
effects of preferences given by a large industrial country to small developing trade partners. In 
the case of Canada, Ketterer et al. (2014) examine the effect on MFN tariffs of Canadian 
                                                          
38
 Examples of such agreements for the USA include the US-Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) and the 
Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI) as well as the former’s GSP trading schemes. PTAs formed by the European Union 
explicitly incorporating non-trade related policy objectives include, among others, the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean 
(MED), African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) and the GSP preferential trading schemes. 
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preferences granted to the USA (namely a large industrial, trading partner) under CUSFTA. In 
the context of Canadian preferences granted to the USA, rent destruction in Canadian markets 
resulting from greater competition from US imports was to be expected. By contrast, Japan’s 
preferences granted to small developing countries were not likely to affect rents in Japan’s 
domestic market. Our expectation that the motivation for PTAs is important in determining 
whether PTAs act as a hindrance to or support for multilateral liberalisation is confirmed by the 
present findings. 
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ANNEX 
 
 
 
Annex Table 1: Summary Statistics 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
∆ti -0.04 0.03 -0.43 0.00 
Ii
any
 0.49 0.50 0 1 
Ii
any0
 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Ii
gsp
 0.48 0.50 0 1 
Ii
gsp0
 0.44 0.50 0 1 
Ii
lgsp
 0.01 0.09 0 1 
Ii
lgsp0
 0.01 0.09 0 1 
∆Xh  -0.69 0.98 -7.74 0.20 
Ri -0.49 0.11 -0.96 0.00 
Diany
94
 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Digsp
94
 0.90 0.30 0 1 
Dilgsp
94
 0.06 0.24 0 1 
Ri
uni
 -0.26 0.11 -0.92 1 
D
ntb
 0.30 0.46 0 1 
D
ntball
 0.30 0.46 0 1 
D
ntball
*Di
94
 0.26 0.44 0 1 
D
ntball
*D
gsp
 0.26 0.44 0 1 
D
ntball
*D
lgsp
 0.01 0.11 0 1 
∆p9294 0.05 0.15 -0.07 0.79 
∆scale 43.28 60.00 -55.44 1120.58 
Pi 0.44 0.50 0 1 
ti,t-1 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.93 
The summary statistics in Annex Table 1 are based on the dataset of 2532 
observations. The ∆scale variable has been re-scaled.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
28 
 
Annex Table 2: Description of Variables and their Sources when analysing UR bound tariff Changes 
Variable Abbreviation Exact definition Source 
Dependent variable 
Bound MFN tariff rate 
reductions  
∆ti 
Reduction in bound ‘Most Favoured Nation’ (MFN) tariffs 
negotiated during the Uruguay Round and those in place 
before the Uruguay Round (i.e. Tokyo Round). 
WTO + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
Explanatory variables 
PTA good variable Ii
j 
Indicator variable taking the value one if a product was 
granted (duty-free) preferential access PTAs in 1993 or 
1994 and was imported by Japan in 1994 (from the 
respective partner country j). 
TRAINS 
    
Reciprocity induced 
changes in market access 
Ri 
Import weighted percentage tariff reductions of Japan's  
principal suppliers between 1986 and 1994  multiplied by 
good i's export share of each principal supplier to Japan; 
finally aggregation over all principal suppliers of good i. 
Finger et al. (2002) 
+ TRAINS + 
authors’ own 
calculations 
    
Political economy variable  ∆Xh 
Change in the elasticity weighted inverse import 
penetration ratio at an ISIC 3-digit industry level between 
1978 (final phase Tokyo Round) and 1992 (final phase 
Uruguay Round) .39 
COMTRADE + 
UNIDO + Kee et al. 
(2009) + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
MFN externality variable  Pi 
Change in the share of small exporters (i.e. non-top 5 
exporters/suppliers) of product i between 1989 and 1994. 
Pi takes the value one if the above mentioned change is 
larger than the median change and zero otherwise.40 
TRAINS + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
Instruments 
Import dummy variable Di
any94 
Dummy variable indicating whether a product was 
imported by Japan from the respective trading partner j; 
regardless of its 'PTA-status' (instrumental variable for Ii
j ). 
TRAINS + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
NTB dummy variable Di
ntb93 
Dummy variable taking the value one if product i was 
subjected to an NTB in 1993 (instrumental variable for Ii
j ). 
TRAINS + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
NTB dummy variable Di
ntball93 
Indicator variable taking the value one if product i was 
subjected to an NTB in 1993 which applied to all trading 
partners (instrumental variable for Ii
j ). 
TRAINS + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
NTB & Import dummy 
variable 
Dntball93*Dany94 Combination of import and NTB indicator variables. 
TRAINS + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
Scale economies Δscale 
Change in value added/number of firms (establishments) 
between 1981 and 1992 (instrumental variable for the 
political economy variable). 
UNIDO + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
 
Δscale*Δworld 
price 
Interaction of the scale economies instrument with the 
average world price change per industry between 1992 and 
1994 (instrumental variable for the political economy 
variable). 
UNIDO + TRAINS 
+ authors’ own 
calculations 
    
World prices 
Δworld pricei, 
(Δworld price)i
2, 
(Δworld price)i
3 
HS 6-digit world prices changes calculated as changes in 
unit-values between 1992 and 1994 (instrumental variable 
for Ii
j). 
TRAINS + authors’ 
own calculations 
    
Unilateral tariff reductions Ri
uni 
Reciprocity measurement as described above but focusing 
on import-weighed unilateral tariff reductions of UR 
participants undertaken between 1986 and 1992 only 
(instrumental variable for Ri). 
Finger et al. (2002) 
+ TRAINS + 
authors’ own 
calculations 
 
 
                                                          
39 The change in the elasticity weighed inverse import penetration ratio ∆Xh is calculated as x
92
 – x78. 
40 
The change in the MFN externality effect or the change in the share of small (non-top5 exporters) of product-
line i to Japan is calculated as share94-share89. 
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Annex Table 3: Uruguay Bound Tariffs Concessions and LGSP Preferences 
 
      
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
  
LGSP 
Duty-Free 
LGSP 
 
LGSP 
Duty-Free 
LGSP 
Ii
j‡  0.020*** 0.020*** 
 
0.028 0.028 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.021) (0.021) 
Ri
‡ -0.006 -0.006 
 
-0.013** -0.013** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
∆Xh‡     0.003 0.003 
 
0.018*** 0.018*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.005) 
Pi -0.003 -0.003 
 
0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ti,t-1 -0.363*** -0.363*** 
 
-0.289*** -0.289*** 
 (0.034) (0.034) (0.069) (0.069) 
Constant -0.017*** -0.017*** 
 
-0.016*** -0.016*** 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) 
Observations 2532 2532   2532 2532 
Number of PTA goods 22 22 
 
22 22 
Hansen's J (p-val.) - - 
 
0.087 0.087 
C-stat (p-val.) - - 
 
0.097 0.097 
Endogeneity (p-val.) - - 
 
0.620 0.620 
Heterosked. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
      Notes: *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. The OLS 
regression results are displayed in Columns (1) and (2), while the results based on IV-GMM 
estimation techniques are reported in Columns (3) and (4). All specifications have been 
estimated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit ISIC 
industry level. ∆Xh has been re-scaled by 10,000. The potentially endogenous regressors are 
marked with ‡. 
 
 
30 
 
Annex Table 4: 1
st
 Stage IV Results 
 
GSP & LGSP Preferences  
 
GSP & LGSP duty-free Preferences 
 
GSP Preferences 
  
Ii R ∆x  
Ii R ∆x  
Ii R ∆x 
Di
94 0.490*** -0.017** -0.308** 
 0.484*** -0.017** 
-0.308** 
 
   
 (0.109) (0.006) (0.144) 
 
(0.108) (0.006) (0.144) 
 
   
Di
gsp 
    
  
 
 0.484*** -0.017** -0.308** 
 
    
  
 
 
(0.108) (0.006) (0.144) 
Dntb
all -0.155 -0.001 0.013  -0.157 -0.006 0.013  -0.157 -0.006 0.013 
 (0.123) (0.001) (0.268)  (0.123) (0.008) (0.268)  (0.123) (0.008) (0.268) 
Dntb
all*D94 0.357*** -0.001 0.046  0.362*** -0.007 0.046  0.362*** -0.007 0.046 
 (0.113) (0.001) (0.156)  (0.113) (0.008) (0.156)  (0.113) (0.008) (0.156) 
∆worldprice -0.011** -0.004*** -0.005  -0.010** -0.004*** -0.005  -0.010** -0.004*** -0.005 
 (0.045) (0.001) (3.696)  (0.004) (0.001) (0.015)  (0.004) (0.001) (0.015) 
∆worldprice2 0.000 -0.000** -0.000  0.000 0.000* 0.000  0.000 0.000* 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
∆worldprice3 0.000 0.000 -0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000  0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Dntb
any 0.079 0.006 -0.184  0.080 0.006 -0.184  0.080 0.006 -0.184 
 (0.089) (0.004) (0.210)  (0.088) (0.004) (0.210)  (0.088) (0.004) (0.210) 
∆scale-economies 0.000 -0.001 0.000*  0.000 0.000 0.000*  0.000 0.000 0.000* 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
∆scale-
eco.*worldprice 
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
0.000  
0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Ri
uni -0.029 0.710*** 0.090  -0.016 0.710*** 0.091  -0.016 0.710*** 0.091 
 (0.091) (0.043) (0.300)  (0.093) (0.043) (0.301)  (0.093) (0.043) (0.301) 
Pi -0.085 0.002 -0.428 
 -0.083** 0.002 
0.001) 
 -0.083** 0.002 0.001 
 (0.030) (0.005) (0.505) 
 
(0.030) (0.005) (0.094) 
 
(0.030) (0.005) (0.094) 
Constant 0.047 -0.293*** -0.522***  -0.045 -0.293*** -0.522***  -0.045 -0.293*** -0.522*** 
 
(0.054) (0.011) (0.169)  (0.055) (0.011) (0.169)  (0.055) (0.011) (0.169) 
Observations  2531 2531 2531   2531 2531 2531   2531 2531 2531 
FTA-goods 1237 1237 1237  1226 1226 1226  1226 1226 1226 
Adj. R2 0.372 0.513 0.060  0.238 0.490 0.060  0.238 0.513 0.060 
Shea's partial R2 0.231 0.489 0.056  0.233 0.513 0.056  0.233 0.490 0.056 
F-test excl. P-val. 0.000 0.000 0.045  0.000 0.000 0.045  0.000 0.000 0.001 
Notes: All regressions are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustering at the ISIC 3-digti industry level.  *, **, *** illustrate the 
10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. The displayed F-test at the bottom of table 12 reports the probability value for the rejection of the 
hypothesis that all excluded instruments are jointly insignificant. The probability values for standard partial R2 and Shea's R2 are reasonably close 
pointing to the sufficient relevance for the instruments to explain the endogenous regressors.  All F-statistics for the preference indicator variable and 
the reciprocity proxy variable exceed 10, while the F-statistics of political economy variable reports values that vary around 2.3.  
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Annex Table 5: Japanese MFN Tariff Cuts and GSP Preferences: Excluding individual covariates 
  OLS   IV-GMM 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(6) (7) (8) (9) (10) 
  
GSP 
Preferences 
(Baseline) 
GSP 
Preferences        
GSP 
Preferences        
GSP 
Preferences        
GSP 
Preferences        
GSP 
Preferences 
(Baseline) 
GSP 
Preferences        
GSP 
Preferences        
GSP 
Preferences       
GSP  
Preferences      
Ii
j‡  0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.018*** 0.014*** 
 
0.017*** 0.018*** 0.010*** 0.009*** 0.007** 
 
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ri
‡ 0.002 
     
-0.010* 
    
 
(0.006) 
     
(0.006) 
    
∆x‡     0.003 0.003 
    
0.011* 0.009 
   
 
(0.002) (0.002) 
    
(0.006) (0.006) 
   
Pi -0.001 -0.001 -0.002    
-0.001 -0.001 -0.001* 
  
 
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
   
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
  
ti,t-1 -0.376*** -0.376*** -0.370*** -0.370***   
-0.334*** -0.350*** -0.308*** -0.290*** 
 
 
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) 
  
(0.074) (0.076) (0.093) (0.093) 
 
Constant -0.021*** -0.022*** -0.024*** -0.025*** -0.045*** 
 
-0.022*** -0.018*** -0.025*** -0.026*** -0.042*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.003) (0.002) 
 
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005) (0.005) (0.001) 
Observations 2532 2532 2532 2532 2532 
 
2532 2532 2532 2532 2532 
Number of FTA 
goods 
1226 1226 1226 1226 1226 
 
1226 1226 1226 1226 1226 
Hansen's J (p-val.)    -    -    -    -    - 
 0.673 
0.6600 0.941 0.947 0.485 
C-stat (p-val.)    -    -    -    -    - 
 0.655 
0.6098 0.952  0.958 0.478 
Endogeneity (p-val.)    -    -    -    -    - 
 0.442 
0.574 0.033 0.021 0.166 
Heterosked. (p-val.) 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000   0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Notes. All regressions are based on heteroskedasticity robust standard errors and clustering at the 3-digit ISIC industry level.  *, **, *** illustrate the 10%, 5%, 1% 
significance levels, respectively. The potentially endogenous regressors are marked with ‡. 
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Annex Table 6: Tobit model: Uruguay Bound Tariffs Concessions and GSP 
Trade Preferences 
 
  
   
 
(1) (2) 
 
(3) (4) 
  
GSP 
Duty-Free 
GSP 
 
1994 GSP Im-
port Share (5%) 
1994 GSP Im-
port Share 
(10%) 
Ii
j‡  0.018*** 0.016*** 
 
0.016*** 0.015*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Ri
‡ 0.002 0.001 
 
0.005 0.006 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
∆x‡     0.003 0.003 
 
0.003 0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
Pi -0.001 -0.001 
 
-0.002 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
ti,t-1 -0.378*** -0.362*** 
 
-0.377*** -0.377*** 
 (0.018) (0.027) (0.020) (0.021) 
Constant -0.021*** -0.020*** 
 
-0.016** -0.014** 
 (0.005) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
Observations 2532 2532   2532 2532 
Number of PTA 
goods 
1237 1226 
 
963 825 
Heterosked. (p-
val.)d 
0.000 0.000 
 
0.000 0.000 
Notes: *, **, *** denote the 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels, respectively. All specifications 
have been estimated using heteroskedasticity robust standard errors, clustered at the 3-digit 
ISIC industry level. 
 
 
Annex Figure 1: Japan’s Applied Average MFN and GSP Preferential Tariffs: 1988-2010 
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Source: Authors' own calculations based on UN-Trains tariff data
